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I. The intergenerational dynamics of incomes
Some recent economic literature recognizes that inequality analysis must be considered in a dynamic framework. Formal models (as for example those proposed by Galor-Zeira 1993 and Banerjee-Newman 1993) obtain persistent inequality at equilibrium outcomes. The proposed stories go as follows: investing in human capital is worth undertaking (i.e. returns to schooling are sufficiently high) but requires personal wealth, since financial markets are imperfect. As a consequence the poorest segment of the population is discriminated against, does not gain access to education and remain poor in subsequent generations. These results contradict the standard predictions of neoclassical models, where the decreasing (marginal) productivity of capital leads to long run equalization of incomes (Stiglitz 1969 , Barro-Sala-i-Martin 1993 . But the transitional dynamics is relevant as well. Independently on whether long run allocation is more or less unequal, will equality occur and how soon ? Since income (or wealth) distribution evolves through subsequent generations, the intergenerational evolution of income or wealth distribution has to be looked at.
In the empirical literature there are two basic approaches to the problem of measurement of this evolution. On one side, the speed of mean regression is taken as an indicator of the degree of independence from inherited conditions. 1 Defining y it as the social status achievement (be it income, wealth or social prestige) of individual i belonging to the generation that is working in period t, a process of social mobility (at the individual level) can be where x it are individual characteristics of individual i (thus sex, age and exogenous events -for example policy reforms or wars), which are uncorrelated with y it-1 (the social status of his/her parents), and n is the number of families (a more proper term would be dynasties). Abstracting from population growth and inter dynastic marriages, an equilibrium social status for dynasty i can be defined as , obtained by regressing the achievements of one generation onto the achievements of the previous one (controlling for individual characteristics), provides information on the speed of adjustment of each dynasty to its "equilibrium" position in the society. From mathematical theory of dynamic systems we know that :
i) for β  < 1 we can speak of a stable process, and for β > 0 (< 0) we have a monotone convergence (divergence). 2
ii) the higher is β , the lower is the speed of adjustment to the individual equilibrium value defined by x it . In facts, It is easy to recognise that when a generation deviates from its equilibrium social status, the following one will persist longer in the deviation the higher is the coefficient β.
Apart from econometric problems in obtaining information on the true β from the estimated β , we are left with the problem of interpretation of the results. 3 Taken by itself β is just a measure of the time length required to reach the equilibrium status, and should not be confounded with the notion of convergence, which requires the additional assumption that all dynasties are characterized by the same long run (equilibrium) social status. 4 However, conditional on the previous assumption (implying x x i i = ∀ = , ,... 1 ) and the additional assumption that the equilibrium social status is a desirable allocation of each dynasty in the society, some ordering of alternative societies may be inferred from β . A higher β implies greater dispersion around this desirable distribution. As an example, let us suppose that social welfare is maximized under an equalitarian distribution of social status (for example incomes). In this case social welfare will be negatively correlated with any measure of dispersion (for example the variance of incomes). But In this case, for given inequality (dispersion) of income distribution in the previous generation, the income inequality of current generation will be higher the greater is the β coefficient. The main limitation of this approach is that it does not provide information about possible rank reversal of dynasties during the process. In other words, a same estimated value for β can be associated with totally different situations. 5
For this reason, some authors prefer an alternative approach. 6 In this case, mobility is measured in terms of chance opportunity open to each dynasty in the passage from one generation to the following. 5 In this case define Y t as a (1 × k) row vector representing the (marginal) distribution of the generation t across k pre-defined categories (that can be thought as classes, or income percentile, or wealth categories). P is a (k × k) transition matrix whose element [p ij ] gives the probability for an individual with initial conditions in category i to end up in category j. In this case the evolution of status distribution across generations can be represented as
In principle, equation [5] is the matrix counterpart of scalar representation described by equation [1] . However, when interpreted as a Markov process, it can be read in probabilistic terms: it tells us how the (marginal) distribution of current generation evolves conditional on the (marginal) distribution of previous generation only. Thus the present distribution is the only information necessary to predict the future evolution of the same distribution. There are several measures that can be obtained from the analysis of matrix P (Shorrock 1978) . The closest analogous to the autoregression coefficient β is the second highest eigenvalue λ 2 . 7 In this case the higher is λ 2 the slower is the convergence to the invariant distribution of incomes (that is the distribution that replicates itself fro infinite repetitions of the transition). 8
II. Interpretations of the dynamic process
Under both approaches (the estimation of either the β coefficient or the transition matrix P) we do not have convincing interpretations of these measures in terms of welfare, that is it is difficult to impose some ordering among alternative situations. A commonly shared point of view claims that the higher is the independence from initial conditions, the greater is the equality of opportunity. In terms of previous measures, the lower are the estimated β (or the corresponding measure associated to the transition matrix P), the more egalitarian is a society. But we know that equality of opportunity does not necessarily corresponds to equality of final outcomes, and therefore this interpretation does not seem granted. However in the literature we find possible interpretations (in terms of welfare) of the statistical measures previously referred at.
Assuming a model of intergenerational (genetic) transmission of intelligence, Becker-Tomes (1986) show that in the absence of liquidity constraints the income correlation between fathers and sons (the β coefficient) measures the degree of "natural" linkage across generations. It is natural in the sense that it acts mechanically, independently of rational choices by the agents. When the parameter β estimated on incomes converges to the genetic β, the society as a whole approximates an intergenerational efficient allocation of resources. One may like or dislike the story of genetic transmission of talent, the true problem is how one can measure income transmission in the absence of liquidity constraints. Becker-Tomes (1986) suggest the use of data referred to the upper tail of income distribution (namely the richest portion of the population), but this procedure is unconvincing because it is based on the assumption that parents know the talent of their sons perfectly at birth. Moreover, Cooper et al. (1993) have shown that mean regression is not constant across the income distribution, being higher at both tails. In accordance with all "natural" theories, the underlying idea is that the convergence to an unequal distribution of incomes reflecting an unequal distribution of talents is good in itself just for it is based on "original" distribution of resources. Pareto (1896) was probably the first author to investigate systematically the distribution of income/wealth. After his discovery of the "iron law of incomes" (to be named the 2-parameter Pareto distribution), for several years he sought the causes of the surprising stability of this empirically derived distribution, across both countries and historical periods. His main explanation of the persictence of this shape was based on the human nature, and on the different degree of natural abilities received by any individual at birth : On the whole, the interpretation of the correlation of father and son incomes based on inheritance of natural abilities is based on shaky evidence, both on biological ground and on economic measures. 11
If one wishes to pursue the study of mobility by means of transition matrices, a suggested interpretation is to impose some regularity assumption on intertemporal individual utilities and social welfare functions and to study the evolution of the (expected) intertemporal social welfare function under alternative assumptions regarding the dynamic process. This is the route proposed by Atkinson (1981) and Dardanoni (1993) with respect to mobility matrices. The former proposes a partial ordering criterion (analogous to Lorenz dominance 12 ) based on the difference in cumulative probability with respect to the main diagonal (diagonalizing transformation). The intuitive idea is that the higher is the dependence from original conditions, the higher is the variance of individual intertemporal utility functions, and consequently higher is the variance of the (aggregated) social welfare function. The latter introduces the decreasing utility of income and therefore weighs higher the mobility changes of the lower tail of income distribution. In both authors the reference point in terms of welfare evaluation is the independence from original conditions, which is justified on the ground of equality of opportunity and, in the absence of any other source of intergenerational linkage, speeds up the convergence to an egalitarian distribution of incomes. The actual problem in implementing these measures is their partial ordering nature, and/or the reliance on the axiomatic approach to welfare evaluation. 13 In this case on avoids assuming inheritability of natural abilities and/or giving support to the idea of an "optimal" distribution of incomes. On the expectation of a wider consensus to the "independence from initial condition" than to "optimal (intergenerational) transmission of resources" as a reference point for social welfare evaluations, the present paper follows the former lead and takes the independence of social achievements from family backgrounds as a relevant criterion against which to compare alternative situations.
III. The decomposition of intergenerational dynamics
Even rejecting the idea of genetic transmission of talents, the existence of a "cultural environment" must be recognized in which children are raised and which differs from family to family. 14 As in the case of genetic transmission, even in this case cultural endowment is transmitted at low cost for the society. Let us take the example of verbal ability. Everyone will agree on the fact that children raised in families who speak good English will (probably) speak good English themselves. Most of the transmission occurs as an unconscious process, and therefore does not represent an intentional investment (of time or other resources) by parents in the verbal ability of their children. Moreover, it is not easily interveneable from a public policy point of view without altering social attitudes. 15 More than measuring in an abstract way, from a political point of view regarding potential policies the interst here is in decomposing observed mobility (or immobility) into single components which may or may not be modified by economic and social policies, in the direction of getting closer to our ideal situation of independence from origins.
A growing theoretical literature points out that indivisibility of investment in human capital combined with imperfect financial markets produces persistent inequality (Galor-Zeira 1993 , Banerjee-Newman 1993 . Since human capital cannot be collateralized and the credit market is segmented, the poor will face a higher cost of credit which will prevent them from accessing to more education and consequently more income (Piketty 1992 , Glomm-Ravikumar 1992 . Once that inherited wealth is a function of family income, inequality within one generation is transmitted to the following one. A companion literature introduces externalities from the environment: while originally intended to the analysis of ghettos' formation, it helps us to enlightening another potential channel of inequality transmission. Since local school funding is proportional to (average) local income, sons raised in richer environments tend to acquire better quality human capitals (Benabou 1993 and .
For all these reasons in the sequel a decomposition of observed mobility into two channels is proposed:
"education acquisition" (henceforth EA) and "other factors" (henceforth OF). The first channel takes into account that educational attainment is conditional on family income and that there are returns to education. If this were the only existing channel for inequality transmission, by conditioning sons' earned incomes on their educational achievements, and their educational achievements on their family incomes, it should be possible to replicate observed patterns of mobility almost exactly. 16 On the contrary, if there is cultural transmission, family networking, or even genetic transmission, then observed immobility will be higher than that implied by EA. The main difference between EA and OF is the possibility of policy intervention. EA can be reduced in two ways: increasing equality of opportunity in educational achievements (by making educational attainment independent from family income) and/or reducing income differentials based on education (i.e. reducing the return to education through an equalizing income or taxation policy). On the contrary, OF can take place rather independently from existing incentive structure, and therefore is more difficult to be modified. In graphical terms it is represented in Figure 1 : solid lines represent the EA and OF channels; dashed lines represent additional links that are ignored by assumption (and therefore will be incorporated in the OF measure). The decomposition of observed mobility can be performed with alternative techniques. Sociologists prefer path analysis, but econometricians object on the ground of (econometric) identification.
Economists are more familiar with regressions, but the exact estimation of returns to schooling is troublesome (Card 1994 ). An alternative technique is proposed here: the transition matrix (father's income → son's income) is compared with the (matrix) product of two other transition matrices (father's income → son's education and son's education → son's income). The joint product of these two matrices is interpreted as the contribution of the EA channel to intergenerational mobility. As better shown later, the difference with the actually observed mobility is taken as evidence of the relative contribution of the OF channel.
[ Figure 1 about here]
IV. Empirical analysis
In the Data Appendix data on intergenerational income mobility are presented for three countries, Germany, Italy and United States. For each country a representative sample of individuals is considered, containing information regarding income and education for both the interviewee and his/her parents. The sample are of comparable sizes, all exceeding one thousand of cases. Given the differences in activity rates for women in the three countries, only analyzed here. Thus it is more appropriate to speak of occupational income mobility than earned income mobility. If we accept the idea that a society should be more concerned with "permanent" inequality (i.e. the inequality attributable to structural factors like the occupational structure) than with "transitory" inequality (i.e. the inequality measured on transitory incomes), then considering occupational incomes seems more coherent with this concern. Tables 1 to 3 report intergenerational mobility matrices based on income quartiles (respectively for Germany, Italy and the United States).
[ Tables 1-2 do not obtain greater clarification in terms of country ranking and, even worse, in terms of explaining the observed differences among countries (see Table 4 ).
[ Table 4 about here]
While the case of Germany being more mobile than United States does not come as a surprise, one remains unclear about the country ranking not being univocal. Looking at Table 5 it can be seen that the ordering of different societies in terms of relative occupational mobility depends on the index we choose. In most cases Italy ranks as the most immobile and Germany as the most mobile, but there are a few cases of order reversal. But these comparisons are of little significance if we are not able to interpret these differences.
[ Table 5 about here]
We start with noticing that the ranking in terms of income mobility is quite similar to the ranking in terms of educational mobility. It is legitimate to suspect that the mobility ranking, and especially the German dominance, is related to the functioning of the educational system. In order to obtain a deeper insight on this issue, let us introduce the following decomposition. Define w s as the income rank achieved by the son and w f the income rank of the corresponding father. Also define e s the educational achievement of the son (for example "compulsory education completed") and e f the educational achievement of his father. Therefore the intergenerational mobility matrices reported in Tables 1-3 
The first addend corresponds to the product of the two matrices reported in Tables 6-7-8 (i.e. the status acquisition of the son conditional on his educational achievement and his father status), and is intended to capture the education acquisition channel mentioned above. The second addend takes into account all the other factors affecting the income achievement of the son conditioning on non obtaining education and father income; it corresponds to the other factors channel. Therefore, when we take the (matrix) product of each couple of matrices reported in Tables 6-7-8 we get the hypothetical mobility that we would have observed if intergenerational mobility were dependent on educational achievements only. The difference with actually observed mobility gives us a measure of all the other factors related with intergenerational transmission (genetic or cultural inheritance, family networking, and so on).
Using a distance measure (for example the Euclidean distance, defined as the mean square distance from 0.25 -the matrix describing the independence from family conditions -for each cell of the matrix) we get a measure of the relative contribution of education acquisition to the observed patterns of intergenerational mobility. When we compare Tables 6-7-8 we also find evidence of some well known facts. Rank correlation indices indicate that United States is the country where educational attainment is most independent of family background, while Italy and Germany share a second position. And when we move from constraints (family income) to incentives (returns to education) we find that the former country keeps the leadership: education pays more in US than in Germany, and it pays more in Germany than in Italy. Thus Italy seems to present the worst of possible worlds: highest dependence from initial conditions, combined with lowest incentives to educational attainments. Germany would present an intermediate situation, and US would represent the prototype of a so-called open society: low conditioning on origin and high incentive to mobility. However this is only part of the story, because the overall mobility that characterises each country depends on additional factors: entry barriers to internal labour markets, imperfection in financial markets, costs of geographical mobility, to mention some of them.
When we consider the ranking of the three countries according to the EA channel, we notice that if mobility were just a matter of educational attainment, United States would be the most mobile society in terms of occupation, Italy would rank second and Germany third. But this is just part of the story, because the three countries present different overall mobility. And when we take the ratio between immobility accounted through educational attainment and overall immobility, we find that not only Germany is the country with lower overall immobility, but it is also the country where the educational achievement channel helps more in equalizing individual opportunities. Probably the German apprentship system, that operates at the end of compulsory education, has a strong equalizing effect in opening high income possibilities for sons who did not get higher education (Soskice 1994) . United States exhibits a greater overall immobility than Germany and a lower contribution of the educational system: an evidence that other factors of immobility (the OF channel) are more effective in the former than in the latter. Finally, Italy scores third, notwithstanding the presence of a widely public educational system: the two matrices clearly show that in this country getting a degree is heavily dependent on father's income, and that the access to the top quartile is almost impossible if a son does not pass the threshold of compulsory education.
As a general conclusion one can infer from previous calculations a rather general statement: the EA contribution to immobility is in the order of 40 to 50%, i.e. granting equality of opportunity in educational attainments would reduce observed immobility of the same amount. In addition, it should appear clear that aggregate indicators of mobility/immobility (and the relative ordering that can be derived from them) can obscure the actual mechanisms underlying the phenomenon.
V. Conclusions
Let us now move to a crucial question from a policy point of view. Let us assume that the "thumb rule" previously obtained (reduce EA channel to zero and obtain a halving of intergenerational inequality transmission) has some reliability. 19 Then would it be worth undertaking from an equalitarian point of view ? If we look to the Social Justice report for the British Labour party (Commission for Social Justice 1994), one gets the impression that current social democratic alliances maintain two joint propositions:
a) increasing total access to education will increase total domestic income;
b) increasing equality of opportunity in accessing education will induce income distribution equality.
While discussing proposition a is not a goal of this paper, 20 our previous discussion seems to provide support to proposition b. However our previous analysis has a stricter implication: increasing equality of opportunity reduces inequality transmission, which does not necessarily prevent the strengthening of other inequality generating devices within one generation. In other words, there is a contradiction between the socialization role and the selection function (Shavit-Blossfeld 1993) . As a thought experiment, think of extending compulsory education up to 24 years. Human capital accumulation will definitively increase, but educational attainment will not signal anything to the labor market.
To be effective, the compulsory school will necessarily become more selective through marks, test scores, alternative programs and other devices. Individuals will go to the market with different "labels", and if the school system has been efficient, the labels will be a better proxy of their "natural" ability than previous educational attainment. Greater inequality of rewards (now reflecting distribution of different abilities) could be predicted, and now even more easily justified. The paradoxical conclusion being that increasing equality of opportunity in educational access could yield increased inequality in income distribution.
Obviously we may claim that extending the access to education is a good thing in itself, for it gives more content to citizenship rights (Okun 1975) and it creates the fabric of a society (Checchi-Salvati 1995) . However, when considering the possibility of increasing the access to education, one should take into account not only the constraint side, but the incentive structure as well. We could almost certainly obtain an increase in efficiency and equity, but at the expense of equality. And the last value is more familiar to the progressive heritage than the other twos (Cohen 1994 ).
Footnotes
(1) Recent examples of this procedure can be found in Becker-Tomes 1986 , Zimmerman 1992 and Solon 1992 Becker-Tomes 1986 have a model where altruistic parents care about children welfare, given a genetic transmission of natural endowments.
(2) Here convergence only means that the distance from the equilibrium position declines with time. In the growth literature this corresponds to the concept of β-convergence, to be non confounded with σ-convergence (a decline in the cross-country -or cross-individuals -dispersion). β-convergence is a necessary condition for σ-convergence. It becomes also sufficient when the steady state equilibrium is identical across state (or across individuals). See Barro-Sala-i-Martin 1991 and 1992. claiming that this is nothing more than mean regression (or Galton's fallacy).
(5) Take two extreme cases, one where the process described by equation [1] is completely deterministic, and the other where a white noise is added to the same equation. In the former case, intergenerational mobility will be zero (absence of rank reversal), whereas in the latter case some mobility will be observed. Obviously the econometric estimate in the latter case will be less efficient.
(6) This is the approach preferred by the sociological analysis, which explores class mobility. Among recent examples Erikson-Goldthorpe 1992 and Cobalti-Schizzerotto 1994.
(7) Given the linear dependence of one row/column, the first eigenvalue is always equal to unity. (13) For example, the three matrices reported in Table 2 (Gramsci 1975, p.131 -my translation) . Analogously: "Consequently selection in school favors children from those families that already possess dominant cultural advantages" (Shavit-Blossfeld 1993, p.) .
(15) With respect to the Italian case, an example is offered by the passage from half-day to full-day primary school, which was intended as a cultural compensatory device, but was made possible -and made in turn possiblewomen full-time jobs.
(16) We do not forget that educational achievements is endogenous in the process and has to be instrumented in order to be used as a regressor. See Card 1993.
Data Appendix
[ ii) an earning function is estimated on a different sample for 1987, after computing gross incomes from self-declared net incomes (Bank of Italy family incomes survey); regressors include age, age squared, school degree, birth region, sector and qualification, and interactions among variables;
iii) using the estimated earning function on original sample, an estimated income is computed for each individual. [ (OECD 1993 , Caroli 1994 . However, since the educational systems of each country have undergone significant changes in last decades, the definition of "compulsory education" has been adapted to each generation:
i) In order to take into account the 1964 reform (that unified primary education and created the existing tripartite system), for German fathers compulsory education is equivalent to general school leaving certificate (hauptschulen -corresponding to 7 years of schooling). For German sons uncompleted compulsory education is equivalent to either nothing or hauptschulen without further apprentship education -corresponding to 7 years of schooling); for them compulsory education is equivalent to general school leaving certificate (realschulen or gymnasium stage 1 -corresponding to 10 years of schooling).
ii) In order to take into account the 1962 reform (that unified the lower secondary school and raised compulsory education from 5 to 8 years of schooling), for both Italian fathers and sons compulsory education is defined as completed primary school (scuola elementare providing licenza elementare degree -it corresponds to 5 years of schooling) if born before 1952, and as completed lower secondary school (scuola media inferiore providing licenza media degree -it corresponds to 8 years of schooling) if born later.
iii) without a specific school reform at the federal level, I relied on Bowles-Gintis 1976 (claiming that 1930 
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